Volume 16
Issue 4 Symposium on Water Resources Management in a Changing World
Fall 1976

Administrative Law - Freedom of Information Act
Clifford K. Atkinson

Recommended Citation
Clifford K. Atkinson, Administrative Law - Freedom of Information Act, 16 Nat. Resources J. 1027 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol16/iss4/17

This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu,
sarahrk@unm.edu.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAWFREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT:
Pre-FOIA statutes giving Federal agencies discretion in withholding agency
information held valid under Exemption 3. Administrator,Federal
Aviation Administration v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975).

The Freedom of Information Act' replaced the inadequate Public
Information section of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1943.2
The PI section 3 had been used ".

.

. more as an excuse for withhold-

ing [information requested by the public] than as a disclosure
statute." 3 Specifically, one of the purposes of the FOIA was to
eliminate such vague standards for exemption of agency information
from disclosure as "for good cause found" and "in the public interest," 4 which were oftentimes used under Section 3 to prevent disclosure of embarrassing or incriminating information.' In lieu of the
ambiguous criterion of PI section 3, the FOIA states nine specific
exemptions 6 to the general policy of full agency disclosure. 7
Exemption 3 of the FOIA8 states:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.

Construction of Exemption 3 by the district and intermediate appellate courts has been varied, some courts requiring that the exempting
statute identify specific classes or categories of items which are to be
exempted 9 and others allowing statutes giving complete discretion to
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 [hereinafter referred to as FOIA].
2. 5 U.S.C. § 1002, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552 [hereinafter referred to as PI section 3].
3. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
4. H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966), U.S. Code, Cong. & Admin. News
1966, at 2419.
5. S.Rep. No. 813, supra note 3.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
7. S.Rep. No. 813, supra note 3.
8. 5- U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) [hereinafter referred to as Exemption 3].
9. See Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639, 640 (1974) and Schecter v. Weinberger, 506
F.2d 1275 (1974), where the courts found that 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a), which allows disclosure of information "as the Secretary [of HEW] ...may by regulations prescribe," does
not specifically exempt information from disclosure; and see Cutler v. C.A.B., 375 F. Supp.
722, 724 (1974), where 49 U.S.C. § 1504 was held to not be under Exemption 3. But see
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the administrator to fall within the scope of Exemption 3.' o The
Supreme Court, however, had not dealt specifically with the construction of Exemption 3 until this case, hereinafter cited as Robertson.
In Robertson, members of the Center for the Study of Responsive
Law requested certain information from the Federal Aviation
Agency relating to airline safety standards in the form of Systems
Worthiness Analysis Programs and Mechanical Reliability Reports
which had been compiled by the Agency. At the administrative level
the Agency succeeded in withholding the requested information,
alleging that Exemption 3 allowed the Administrator to exempt the
information from disclosure under authority of § 1104 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.'' The same argument for nondisclosure was
employed in subsequent proceedings in the federal courts, wherein
the Plaintiffs sought an injunction against the Administrator.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari from a decision by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upholding the
District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
The lower courts had held that ". . . the public information standard
within the meanof [§ 1104J is not a specific exemption by statute
12
Act."
Information
the
of
3
ing of Exemption
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals,
which suggested that the FOIA provides a comprehensive guide to
congressional intent with regard to exemption of information and
that the term "specific" in Exemption 3 requires reference to a
particular class of documents. The Court stated that if the appellate
court's interpretation were adopted, then all pre-FOIA statutes
exempting information from disclosure without identification of

Evans v. Dept. of Transportation, 446 F.2d 821, 824 (1971) and the principal case for what
is effectively a reversal of the Cutler decision.
10. See Evans v. Department of Transportation, supra note 9, holding that 49 U.S.C.
§ 1504 sets out sufficient guidelines to be included under Exemption 3. Also see Sears v.
Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122, 125 (1974), where the court held that a statute requiring information relating to patents to be withheld except "... as may be determined by the
Commissioner" falls within the ambit of Exemption 3.

11. 49 U.S.C. § 1504 [hereinafter referred to as § 1104] states in relevant part:
Any person... may make written objection to the public disclosure of information contained in any application, report, or document..., stating the
grounds for such objection. Whenever such objection is made, the Board or

Administrator shall order such information withheld from public disclosure
when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely
affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the
public (emphasis supplied).
12. 498 F.2d 1031, 1036 (1974).
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particular classes of documents would be repealed by implication;
saying that "[r] epeals by implication are disfavored." ' I
The Court cited the legislative history of the FOIA to support its
argument. It noted that the senate subcommittee "... expressed the
clear intention that ... [the] exemption statutes [already in effect]
would remain unaffected by the [FOIA] "' I and that neither the
House nor the Senate raised any question nor made any objection
when the FAA expressed the opinion during hearings that § 1104
was encompassed within Exemption 3.As further proof of the legislative intent, the Court pointed to the fact that Exemption 3 was not
amended in 1974, despite the close Congressional scrutiny that the
FOIA received by Congressional committees.
Finally, the Court stated that the FOIA and § 1104 are, in fact,
coextant and consistent. It reasoned that the underlying purpose of
the FOIA is to serve the public interest through a policy of opening
public records to greater access while preserving confidentiality in
certain areas,' I and that § 1104 is a reflection of that policy, wherein Congress determined that the public interest was best served
through a grant of discretion to the Administrator.' 6 Refusing to
examine the Congressional motive, the Court said: "The wisdom of
the balance struck by Congress is not open to judicial scrutiny."
In environmental litigation, especially where the necessity for or
the adequacy of an environmental impact statement is being challenged, the plaintiff's case is largely dependent upon the availability
of information relating to the subject matter of the suit. Ordinarily,
because of the expense of independent research, this information is
available only through the adverse parties or through a government
agency.'7 The broad construction of Exemption 3 adopted by the
Robertson court, allowing a statute which gives the administrator
discretion to disclose or withhold information "in the public interest" to satisfy the Exemption 3 requirement of specificity, could
13. 422 U.S. at 265, citing the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,

129 (1974).
14. 422 U.S. at 264.
15. 422 U.S. at 261
16. 422 U.S. at 266.
17. One instance where a Federal agency is empowered to obtain information from
industry is set out in 15 U.S.C. § § 171-98, which establishes the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. One of the Bureau's functions is to "foster, promote, and develop the various

manufacturing industries of the United States .. " 15 U.S.C. § 175. To facilitate this
process, the Bureau extends a survey form to various industries in order to gain information
relating to current expenditures made on plant improvements. See Citizens for a Better
Environment v. Department of Commerce, 8 E.R.C. 2049 (1976), for a more detailed
presentation of the Bureau's activities.
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provide agencies with an effective tool with which to ward off requests for information from the public.
That Robertson is being followed in the field of environmental
litigation is shown by Citizens for a Better Environment v. Department of Commerce,"8 decided in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. The Plaintiffs sought ". . . information
relating to expenditures made on air and water pollution abatement
equipment" by U.S. Steel' I and the defendant resisted disclosure,
relying on Exemption 3 and 15 U.S.C. 176a.2 I The court, citing
Robertson, held that the statute, which generally prohibited disclosure of "confidential" information, was within the ambit of
Exemption 3 and that the Agency could, therefore, withhold the
requested information.
While the Citizens court is one of the first to employ the Robertson holding in environmental litigation, it is probable that courts will
continue to do so in the future in light of the clearly expressed
Supreme Court opinion. Two examples of statutes similar to the one
dealt with in Robertson, granting broad administrative discretion to
withhold information, appear below. Under Robertson these statutes
could fall within the scope of Exemption 3.
15 U.S.C. § 1516
The Secretary of Commerce shall have control of the work of gathering and distributing statistical information ... relating to the subjects confided to his department 21 ... and he may... publish such
statistical information... in such a manner as to him may seem
wise (emphasis supplied).
43 U.S.C. § 1461
Nothing in ... this title shall be construed to limit or restrict ... the
authority of the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe such rules and
regulations as he may deem proper governing the inspection of the
18. 8 E.R.C. 2049 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Citizens].
19. Id. at 2049.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 176a states:
Any ... information furnished in confidence... shall be held to be confidential.

...

The Director... shall not permit anyone

other

than..

.

em-

ployees.., to examine such reports....
The agency procedure was to include a caption on all surveys stating that the information
would be held in confidence, thereby making all such information "confidential." But see
M. A. Schapiro & Co. v. S.E.C., 339 F. Supp. 467 (1972), where the court stated that
Exemption 3 does not relate to a statute that generally prohibits disclosure of confidential
information. Id. at 470.
21. Some of the bureaus under the supervision of the Department of Commerce are:
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce; Coast and Geodetic Survey; Federal Maritime
Board; Inland Waterways Administration; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Bureau of Commercial Fisheries; and Environmental Science Services Administration.
15 U.S.C. § 1511.
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records of said departments 2 2 ... by the general public, and any
person having particular interest ... may be permitted to take copies

of such records under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior(emphasis supplied).
CONCLUSION
While the Robertson holding has not yet been widely employed in
environmental litigation, there is no question that it affords courts
the opportunity to deny environmental groups access to information
vital to their case. The question which remains, however, is whether
the courts will hold the Robertson decision to instances where the
statute proscribes a "public interest" standard or whether they will
interpret it, as did the Citizens court, as a general relaxation of the
FOIA requirement of specificity.
If the full impact of Robertson is realized, the FOIA, like its
Section 3 predecessor, will come to be used ".

.

. more as an excuse

for withholding information requested by the public than as a disclosure statute."
CLIFFORD K. ATKINSON

22. "The Secretary of the Interior is charged with the supervision of public business
relating to the following subjects and agencies: 1. Alaska Railroad; 2. Alaska Road Commission; 3. Bounty-lands; 4. Bureau of Land Management; 5. Bureau of Mines; 6. Bureau of
Reclamation; 7. Division of Territories and Island Possessions; 8. Fish and Wildlife Service;
9. Geologic Survey; 10. Indians; 11. National Parks Service; 12. Petroleum conservation; 13.
Public lands, including mines." 43 U.S.C. § 1457.

